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Curd: Substance and Procedure in Rule Making

SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN RULE MAKINGC

Tao-ojs H. S. CuRD"-

W

ITH the impetus given to rule-making by the courts' since the
inauguration of such a system in 1934 by Congress for federal
courts, - the importance of the disputed distinction between substantive and procedural law takes on new significance. The question of the distinction, if any, has arisen in part in connection with
the matters of (a) the merely academic classification of the law, (b)
the subject of conflict of laws where there is a difference on a particular question between the lex fort and the lex loci, and (c) rulemalking by the courts.
As late as 1941 a very distinguished scholar and law writer
stated that the distinction was clear and that there was no twilight
zone.- However, he was discussing the subject mainly in relation
to the mere classification of the law and to the subject of conflict of
laws. Many are the views that have been expressed on the question.
There is a plethora of literature by eminent teachers. Austin said
the distinction between substance and procedure "cannot be made
the basis of a just division." 4 The terms "adjective" and "substantive" were invented by Bentham., Holland assumed there was
a difference and in general terms defined each.' Although Salmond
recognized the distinction, he seems to have been the first to recognize the twilight zone and pointed out that there are many procedural rules which in their operation are "substantively equivalent"
to rules of substantive law. 7 Chamberlayne takes the view that there
is no distinction- while Cook admits there is a distinction but invents
the "twilight zone". 9 This view seems to be the most widely accep* This paper was prepared as a report of a subcommittee of the West
Virginia Judicial Council and presented to the council at its meeting on
October 23, 1946.
** Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, Welch, West Virginia.
I Of. Judicial Bule-Ma7king Power Gairs Ground (1943) 27 J. Am. JuD.
Soc. 59.
2 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. § 723 (3934).
3 See Kocourek, ,ubstance and Procedure (1941) 10 FORDHAM L. REV.
172.
4 2 AusTrin, L CTuRES ON JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1879) 611.
5 Kocourek, supra note 3, at 157.
6 OLLANID, JURISPRUDENCE (11th ed. 1910) 89.
7SALMom, JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) § 172.
8 1 CHAMBERLAYNE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1911)

9 Cook, "Substance"
42 YATu L. J. 333.

and "Procedure"

§

171.

in the Conflict of Laws (1933)
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ted. Chamberlayne claimed the distinction was of little importance
and is based on difference in form of statement; that the distinction
is "illusory and artificial". 10 Cook says he cannot agree unless he
adds "for the purpose at hand.""' But he says, "For other purposes it may become vital and important. "' The real importance in
West Virginia of whether there is a distinction, what it is, and
whether there is a twilight zone, arises from the statutes passed in
1935's and in 1945,'14 giving the supreme court of this state power to
"From time to time make and promulgate general rules
and regulations governing pleading, practice and procedure in
such court (Supreme) and in all other courts of record in this
state. All statutes relating to pleading, practice, and procedure shall have force and effect only as rules of the court and
shall remain in effect unless and until modified, suspended, or
annulled by rules promulgated pursuant to the provisions of
this section.
"When and as the rules of the court herein authorized shall
be prescribed, adopted and promulgated, all laws and parts of
laws that conflict therewith shall be and become of no further
force or effect, to the extent of such conflict."
A number of the states have almost the same provisions as we
regarding the rule-making power of their respective courts. Other
states have rule-making authority but it is not so broad. Sometimes
The authority is given by the constitution of the state. In nearly all
states the courts have always assumed the authority on a small scale
in merely minor matters dealing largely with the administration of
the court. 15 In Michigan, the Constitution of 1850 authorized procedural rules of court but, strangely enough, all later changes in
procedure were made by the legislature. 6 The courts everywhere
have been reluctant to assume the role of rule-makers wherever a
conflict with substantive law might occur. Congress in 1934 authorized the Supreme Court of the United States to promulgate rules
of civil procedure but specifically provided against encroachment on
10 CHAMBERLAYNE,

Zoe. cit. supra note 8.

11 Cook, supra note 9, at 337.

(1).

12 Ibid.
13W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 37; W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943) § 5183.
'4AV. Va. Acts 1945, c. 44; W. VA. CODE (Michie, Supp. 1945)

§ 5183

15 Harris, The Extent and Use of Bule Making Authority (1938) 22 J.
Am. JuD. Soc. 27, analyzes and classifies the nile-making power in the several
states.
'OId. at 28.
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the substantive rights of any litigant 7 and, to make doubly sure that
substantive rights might not be encroached on by the Court, provided that the rules should not take effect until Congress had an opportunity to approve or disapprove them. They were submitted to
Congress, no change was made, and they went into effect in 1938.18
As pointed out in 1926, the power of the courts among the various states at that time to make rules fell into three classes: (1) full
and complete power granted either by constitution or statute; (2)
power given not expressly limited to rules "consistent with law and
statute" but with the courts conforming to that view neverheless;
(3) power subject to an express limitation granting the courts power to make rules "not inconsistent with statute or law."19
A complete check has not been made but the following states
would seem currently to fall in class 1: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, 'Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. There may be others as none of the authorities consulted
was of later date than 1942. At that time many other states were
working on the subject of rules and may be in class 1 by this time.
Some of those listed are required to file the rules with the legislature.
Within the past twenty years, and especially since the congressional legislation, the bar .and the bench have been rule-conscious
and the tendency is decidedly toward depending more on the court
for rules than on legislative enactment. In other words, the idea is
rapidly becoming popular. But many doubts and questions arise,
viz.: What is substantive law and what is procedural law? Is there
always a clear distinction? Is there a twilight zone? Where must
Ihe court stop in its rule-making power ? Is there a clear definition
of substantive law and another of procedural law? Can a formula
be provided by which courts may be guided in knowing where to
stop, or must they be governed largely by expediency in making
rules? In case of doubt or in all cases, should the rules be submitted
to the legislature for approval ?
It is the opinion of many that it should not and will not be the
purpose of the Judicial Council of this state, or the supreme court,
1748 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. 723 (1934) ("Such rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant").
is Cf. Supreme Court Adopts Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal Dis.
triet Courts (1928) 24 A. B. A. J. 97.
19 Paul, The Rule Making Power of Courts (1926) 1 WAsH. L. Rm,. 163.
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to enter into a large-scale program of rule-making. Our present
system of rules, they say, whether enacted by the legislature or
promulgated by the courts, has been too satisfactory, too complete,
and too fully responsive to all needs of the bar and of the public to
give rise to a demand for any great changes. If any one in West
Virginia is unduly delayed in defending himself or in enforcing a
right under our present rules of procedure, it is not, generally speaking, because of fault in the rules. The fault is traceable to the bar
for failing to observe the existing rules or to the court for failing to
enforce them. But, as time passes and conditions change, it will, as
heretofore, become desirable to make some changes in our procedure
and it will have to be done either through the legislature, or, since
the legislature has delegated the function to the supreme court, by
that court. It therefore behooves the Judicial Council, under the
authority given it by the legislature, ' to make recommendations to
the supreme court regarding desirable rule changes and to inform
itself very thoroughly regarding the historical background of rulemaking as well as and particularly regarding the matter of substantive and procedural law, the extent to which the court can go in
making rules, and the limitations that may be imposed by statute,
common law practice, the constitution, tradition, the bar, and public
sentiment. The duty is incumbent upon the bar of this state to inform itself and to make its wishes known to the Judicial Council and
to the supreme court.
In the consideration of this subject, we are met at the thresh(.1d with our state constitutional provisions regarding the divisions
of our government into three departments, legislative, executive, and judicial.2 ' It may be claimed, that, by our 1935 statute, 2 2 the legislature delegated legislative authority to the judiciary.
This objection is met by adherents of the rule-making power of the
courts with the proposition that: (a) it has always been the function of the courts from earliest times to make the rules governing
the procedure of the courts; (b) rule-making, so far as it does not
invade substantive rights but involves only procedural rights, has
been a judicial function at all times, rather than a legislative one;
(e) there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which
requires the state governments to keep entirely separate the three
.20W. VA. COD (Miehie, 1943)
Z W. VA. CONST. art. V.
2Supra note 13.

§

5707 (5).
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departments of government and any two or more of these departments may be combined into one agency unless prohibited by the
state constitution ;2 and (d) therefore, when the legislature delegated all rule-making in this state to the supreme court, we merely reverted to the original practice of the old days. In 1792, the Attorney
General of the United States requested information from the United
States Supreme Court concerning the rules and regulations of the
Court. The Chief Justice, speaking for the Court and its members,
replied that the court considered the practice of the courts of the
King's Bench and Chancery in England as affording outlines for
practice in this Court and that they will from time to time make such
alterations therein as circumstances may render necessary. 4 At
that time, pleading, practice, and procedure in England was largely
and had been from the beginning of the English common law by
rules of the courts. 2' But when our Federal Constitution incorporated provisions for the three branches of government, many of the
states felt called upon to do the same. In England, the courts had
grown up as a tradition; but in this country they were created in
greater part by the legislative branch of the goverunent. The legislatures had more prestige than the courts they created"' and it was
easier to pass a statute than to "await on the development of court
procedure by court decision and tradition. "117 So rule-making was
gradually taken over by the various luegislatures with the acquiescence of the courts and, generally, the courts everywhere have been
reluctant to exercise their inherent rule-making power. It is interesting to note, however, that in some instanees the courts have not
followed strictly these legislative enactments, notably in regard to
contempt.2"
Acquiescence by the courts in the taking over of the rule-making power by the legislatures does not imply that the courts have
23 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908); Claiborno
County v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400 (1884); Consolidated Rendering Co. v.
Vermont, 207 U. S. 541 (1908).
24 2 Dall. 411 (U. S. 1792).
22 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW (1926) 261.
2-PouND, THE FORMATiVE ERA o AmICAN LAW (1938) 38.

27Harris, The Rluing Making Power in JuDiCIAL AD-MINISTATION MONOGRAIHS, Series A (Collected) (1942) 6.
ZS Of. Voorhis v. Childs' Ex'r, 17 N. Y. 354 (1858); Reubens v. Joel,

13 N. Y. 488 (1856); Booth v. Farmers & Mechanic' Nat. Bank, 1 Thomps.
& C. 45 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1873). The cases are collected in Paul, aupra note
19.
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abdicated to the legislatures the functions which have ahvays been
regarded as judicial. As pointed out, in a Washington case,
"Assuming the right of the Legislature to make rules for
the court, and acknowledging its continued action in that respect, it does not follow that such action is a legislative function.
Not all acts performed by a Legislature are strictly legislative
in character. A failure to recognize this distinction often gives
rise to the belief that one of our law-making bodies has abdicated its duty and attempted to transfer its legislative mantle to
the shoulders of another body not legislative, thereby subverting the purpose of its laws which govern them enacted by their
duly chosen representatives." 29
Chief Justice Marshall once said:
"It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the
courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and
exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to
others powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself. Without going further for examples, we will take that,
the legality of which the counsel for the defendant admit. The
17th section of the Judiciary Act, and the 7th section of the
additional act, empower the Courts respectively to regulate
their practice. It certainly will not be contended that this might
not be done by Congress. The courts, for example, may make
rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing
of declarations and other pleadings and other things of the
same description. It will not be contended that these things
might not be done by the legislature, without the intervention
of the Courts; yet it is not alleged that the power may not be
conferred on the judicial department.
"The line has not been exactly drawn which separates these
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the
legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to
act under such general provisions to fill up the details.",3
To the same effect in the companion case of Bank of the United
v. Halstead, Mr. Justice Thompson remarked:
"Congress might regulate the whole practice of the Courts
if it was deemed expedient so to do; but this power is vested in
the Courts; and it never has occurred to anyone that it was a
delegation of legislative power." 31
29 State ez rel Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash.
1, 5, 267 Pac. 770, 771 (1928).
30 Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42 (U. S. 1825).
3110 Wheat. 51, 61 (U. S.1825).
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State courts have used similar language, as in the statement by the
Colorado supreme court that
"This court has always been of the opinion, we believe unanimously so, that the act of 1913 was not a delegation of legislative authority. The regulation of its own practice and
procedure has always been a matter for the court except so far
as the legislature has interfered. See 15 C. J. 901. The act
of 1913 restored that power which other legislatures had
partially taken away and gave the added power to make rules
for lower courts just as other states have done, and as Congress gave the United States Supreme Court power to make

rules in equity. "32

An objection sometimes raised is that the legislature must legislate more in detail regarding pleading, practice and procedure.
rather than in mere generalities, to effect a valid transfer of rulemaking power to the courts. But numerous cases may be cited in
which such authority has been upheld where only a broad general
policy or pattern was expressed by the legislature and the working
out of that pattern was left to the agency designated to effectuate
it.

33

Objection might be raised to provisions keeping present statutes
in effect as rules until others are promulgated by the court in lieu
thereof. This point has been passed on in State ex rel. Foster-WVyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court,3 4 which quoted and followed the
rule as stated in a standard legal encyclopedia in the following
teims:
"Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law and is
complete in and of itself, it is fairly within the scope of the
legislative power to prescribe that it shall operate only on the
happening of some specified contingency. Such a statute lies
dormant until put into active force by the existence of conditions on which it is intended to operate." 5
As may be concluded from what has been said, there is little
question as to the present-day tendency toward favoring the courts
in making rules, even to the extent of encroaching on substantive
law in the twilight zone, especially if the legislature is later to ratify
32 Ernst v. Lamb, 73 Colo. 132, 133, 213 Pac. 994, 995 (1923).
33 Cf. Rinehart v. 'oodford Flying Service, 122 W. Va. 392, 9 S. E.

(2d) 521 (1940); Fahey v. Mallonee, 67 S. Ct. 1552 (U. S. 1947); Rohrer v.
Milk Control Board, 322 Pa. 257, 186 Atl. 336 (1936); Saratoga Springs v.
Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908) ; Vail v. Seaborg, 120 Wash. 126, 207 Pac. 15 (1922) ; State ex rel. Oregon R. R. & Nay. Co.
v. Railroad Cor'n, 52 Wash. 17, 100 Pac. 179 (1909).
34Supra note 30.
35 12 C. J. 864 (1917).
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the rules. There is little question as to what the supreme court in
this state can do under its rule-making power as vested in it by the
legislature. Unless it conflicts with a law on a question arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States" or some specific
clause of the state constitution,37 it will bave the final decision. Our
supreme court will determine all questions of a constitutional nature, of policy, of expediency, of what is substantive law and what
.s procedural law, what changes are desirable and what approbation
such rules will receive from the bar and the public when these
ehanges shall have been made. and so it is not a matter so much of
what the court can do, but what it should do, with which we are concerned. It is a tribute to the court's integrity and the confidence of
the legislature in our supreme court that such a wide latitude has
been entrusted to it in the making of rules for its own procedure and
that of inferior courts in the state. Such authority, for all the
more reason, should be used by the court only where clearly needed
to promote justice and for uniformity in procedure throughout the
state.
It has already been observed that there is quite a contrariety of
opinion on what is substantive and what procedural law,, whether
they can be clearly defined, whether there is a twilight zone, whether procedural law does not, indeed, very often include substantive
law. For many years eminent scholars and teachers have debated
the subject and notably Holland, Austin, Salmond, Cook, Chamberlayne, Kocourek, and Bentham. Preliminary to final action by the
United States Supreme Court on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
an advisory committee of distinguished teachers, lawyers, and
judges"' prepared them. American Bar Association institutes on
Federal Rules were held in various parts of the United Slates under
the auspices of the American Bar Association and were attended by
attorneys from all the states." In the course of discussions, when
the Institute was being held at Cleveland, it was conceded that some
of the rules might be held invalid as violating substantive law. 40
And so it seems now to be very generally conceded that there is a
36 A rule of practice prescribed for the circuit courts by the state supreme court which conflicts with an act of Congress is void, Suckley's Adm'r
v. Rotchford, 12 Gratt. 60 (Va. 1855).
37 EX parte Doyle, 62 W. Va. 280, 57 S. E. 824 (1907).
38 The order of appointment, including ihe names of the distinguished
personnel constituting the committee appears in 295 U. S. 774 (1935).
32 See 63 A. B. A. REP. 697 (1938).

40 A

ERICAN BAR AssocIATIoN,

STITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES (1938)

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE CLEVELAND

IN-

347.
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twilight zone applicable for rule-making though possibly not so
much as in the matter of interpretation of conflict of laws. For instance, statutes of limitations are regarded as remedial and therefore procedural in their nature, in the matter of conflict of laws.4'
So, also, as to proper parties to a suit ivhere an assignment is involved, as to many presumptions, exemptions, homestead and otherwise,
sets-off, counter-claims, many statutes involving evidence, the parol
evidence rule, instances involving competency of witnesses, and even
the measure of damages. 42 There is considerable controversy as to
whether a law which shifts the burden of proof is substantive or pro43
cedural but it is generally regarded as substantive.
Sampson v. Channel 44 clearly shows the difficulty under which
courts labor where the question arises in dubious or twilight zone
cases. No formula is possible and so they say the law is substantive
for one purpose and procedural for another purpose. 4', As one editorial staff paraphrased the holding,
"A Federal court should, for the purpose of determining
the incidence of the burden of proof as to contributory negligence in a negligence action, its jurisdiction over which is
based on diversity of citizenship, regard the question as one
of substantive law as to which it should follow the law of the
state in which it sits, although by the law of such state the
question is regarded as one of procedure as to which the state
courts follow the law of the forum rather than the law of the

state in which the cause of action arose.

40

The accompanying annotation goes on to say that the classifications
"substantive"
and "procedural" were not due to any intrinsic
character of the questions but were merely artificial and adopted to
serve the purpose at hand "as indicated by the fact that courts have
treated these questions as substantive for certain purposes and pro-

cedural for others. "47
41 MeElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312 (U. S. 1839); MIN R, CONFLICT O1
LAWS (1901) 522; of. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT oF LAWS (1934) §§ 603-605.
42 See Kocourek, Substance and Procedure (1941) 10 FoRDnAii
L. Rsv.
157 cited supra notes 3 and 5; of. NV. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943) § 5725.
43 Pariso v. Towse, 45 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
44 110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), cert. denied, Channell v. Sampson, 310 U. S. 651 (1940)
45Id.
at 756 ("It is apparent, then, that burden of proof does not fall
within either category of 'substance' or 'procedure' by virtue of any intrinsic compulsion, but the matter has been made to turn upon the purpose
at hand to be served by the classification").
46128 A. L. R. 394, syllabus (1940).
47 Id. at 409.
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43
Many of our statutes and laws which on their face would seem
to be procedural would also seem clearly to involve substantive
rights. We find many procedural statutes that appear to have
rights in the procedure itself or expressions of policy of the legislation involved. If the statute or law gives a right or a privilege
which on its face may be a benefit to one person over another, o
takes away an advantage that may affect one over another in a suit,
nevertheless, although the statute may primarily involve procedure
there may be a substantive right involved. In many of these twilight
zone cases the distinction or difference is ahvays there, at times
plainly in view. At other times, it is not so plain but indefinite, and
still again, in such a small degree that it can be recognized only by
intuition if at all, but the difference is still there. For instance, a
question has been raised as to Rule 345 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as to the use of the word "commenced". In West Virginia, of course, an action is commerced on the issuance of the process,49 in some states when process is placed in the hands of an officer to serve it, in others when it is served on the defendant, and in
still others when the complaint is filed. Rule 3 says it is conmenced
by filing the complaint with the court. The question is, does not
Rule 3 affect substantive law in applying the statute of limitations ?.
At the hearing on the Rules of Civil Procedure before the Senate Judiciary Committee considerable controversy arose over the
question as to whether substantive law was involved in Rule 13 regarding counter-claims, in Rule 17 (a) regarding where corporations
may be sued and whether a partnership may be sued in its trade
name, and in Rule 37 regarding liability of an attorney in taldng
depositions. Rules 34, 35, and 37 were also questioned for similiar
reasons.
As noted earlier Kocourek said the distinction was improper.
That was in 1941. However, in the Proceedings of the Institute in
Cleveland in 1938, this statement was made:
"A great problem that the Advisory Committee had to
deal with and which the members of the Bar will have to deal
with is the distinction between substantive rights and procedural."'
"A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
§ 5529; Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Auvil,
109 W. Va. 753, 156 S. E. 111 (1930).
ro Cf. Note 4 to Rule 3, prepared by the Advisory Committee, in which
this point is raised.
51 AmERICAN BA. AssocA'TIoN, sutpra note 40, at 182.
43

49W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943)
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Merely as a matter for the record and ready reference, the follwing definitions, formulas, and comments regarding procedural
and substantive law may be consulted.
According to Lorenzen, ". . .' substance' includes all rules deterraining the legal relations which the courts will declare when all the
facts have been made known to them, whereas 'procedure' relates to
the process or machinery by which the facts are made known to the
courts.

'52

Judge Magruder has said, "procedural rules are those which
concern methods of presenting to a court the operative facts upon
which the legal relations depend; subsi antive rules, those which concern the legal effect of those facts after they have been established.
Chief Justice Marshall, in defining the words, "modes of process" in the Judiciary Act of 1789, said: "'. . .the term is applicable
to every step taken in a cause. It indicates the progressive course of
the business from its commencement to its termination; and 'modes
of process' may be considered as equivalent to modes or manner of

proceeding, "4
The whole matter was extensively discussed, in 1938, at the
Cleveland Institute on Federal Civil Procedure, in the following
terms:"
"In the case of Beers v. Haighton, 9 Pet. 329, 9 L. Ed. 145
(1835), the decision in Wayman v. Southard was well summarized by Mr. Justice Story. He said (page 360), 'The power to
alter and add to the process and modes of proceedings in a suit
embrace the whole progress of such suit, and every transaction
in it from its commencement to its determination and until the
judgment should be satisfied and . . . it authorized the court
to prescribe and regulate the conduct of the officer in the execution of the final process in giving effect to that judgment.'
"One case more, in .Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 2
Sup. Ct. 443, 27 L. Ed. 506 (1882), Mr. Justice Miller said
'The term procedure is so broad in its significance that it is
seldom employed in our books as a term of law. It included in
its meaning whatever is embraced in the three technical termspleading, evidence, and practice.'
52 Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 32
YALE L. J. 311, 325. For a similar analysis, consult 3 BEALE, CONFLICT 014
LAws (1935) § 584.
r,3Supra note 44 at 755, n. 2.

5 Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 27 (U. S. 1825).
supra note 40, at 304 ff.

:.- PROCEEDINGS,
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"In Poyser v. Minors, 45 L.T. R. 33, 7 Q. B. D. 328 (1881),
the question arose whether a rule of the county court as to the
effect of a nonsuit was a rule 'for regulating the practice of
the courts and forms of proceedings therein.' The validity
of the rule was challenged on the ground that it attempted to
declare substantive law, namely, the legal effect of the judgment of the court. Lush, L. J., said on this point:
" 'Practice in the larger sense ... like procedure... denotes the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives or defines
the right and which, by means of the proceeding, the court
is to administer, the machinery, as distinguished from its
product.'
"The county court rules were compared with the provisions
of the English rules under the Judicature Act on the same subject and it was declared that taken as a whole it was clear that
the challenged provision was procedural.
" 'The language of the section which I read... is not exactthe right of a defendant to appeal to the Court of Appeals from
an order committing him to jail for contempt of court in disobeying an injunction was challenged on the ground that an
appeal to that court was limited to matters of practice and procedure, other classes of appeals going to the divisional court.
"The language of Lord Justice Lush in Poyser v. Minors,
supra, was quoted with approval, and Slesser, L. J., said, (p.
93):
" The language of the section which I read.., is not exactly the same as that of the order we have here to consider, but
I think the definition of practice which is there stated is one
which properly can be applied here; and I ask myself, therefore, within the meaning of these observations of Lush, L. J..
whether this order for committal is not a mode of proceeding
by which a legal right is enforced. It appears to me clearly that it is so.' "
Such are the principal definitions found and, frankly, they do
not seem to be very helpful, whether as definitions, as formulas, or
in arriving at any determination as to whether any statute or law is
substantive or procedural for rule-making purposes. After all, it
would seem clear that no all-embracing formula can be devised to
guide the court in rule-making. Each rule and each proposed change
will have to be studied separately and stand on its own merits, treated in the light of certain principles and policies.
A few illustrations from our own code may be referred to as indicating the vagueness of any definition that might be formulated
or the uselessness of trying to formulate any definition or establish
any rule of thumb that can fit every case. The code provides for
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certain procedure before the circuit courts in the instances of closing
down a mine"' or passing on assessments fixed by the assessor"7 but
no appeal is provided to the supreme court. Unquestionably there
is procedure involved here. An appeal is procedural but in this procedure there is a certain right or lack of right representing a policy
established by the legislature. The failure of the legislature to give
that privilege is a right within procedural matters."' The statute
giving us the right of appeal does not infringe on due process of
law, nor can the court by rule authorize an appeal where the legislature has denied the right of appeal.
Another instance is the following: The plaintiff recovers a
judgment, which the statute makes a lien on the real estate of the
defendant, but provides that, before enforcing such a right., the
plaintiff must have an execution issued and returned indla bona
after which the plaintiff may then proceed in equity to enforce the
lien against the real estate." After the judgment has been obtained, all the other steps are procedural; but it is not likely the supreme
court would undertake to state a rule making unnecessary the use of
an execution before proceeding to sell the real estate. Again there
is a right or policy involved within the method of procedure. Or
take the case of an attachment. IHere the plaintiff has a substantive
right at law to enforce his claim against the defendant. After that,
it would seem that everything else involved is the method of procedure to enforce such a claim but, in doing so. there would seem to
be involved some rights of a substantive nature. Evidence is procedural but many rights become involved in all phases of evidence
wherever the legislature has expressed a policy or declared itself on
the competency of certain evidence. The taking of depositions is procedural but there are certain rights in regard to the taking of depositions which have been established by the legislature. The
method may be procedural but these certain rights probably should
not be changed by the court.
At one time, the United States Supreme Court in the Botsford
case," held that an order of court to examine the plaintiff, physically or mentally, relative to an injury in controversy, unduly inter56
57

W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943)

§ 2397.

Id. at § 694.

5" Fleshman v. McWhorter, 54 W. Va. 161, 46 S. E. 116 (1903); of. Ex
parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (U. S. 1869)
59 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943) § 3769.
0 Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 1II U. S. 250 (1891).
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fered with private rights and was improper. Nevertheless the Court
later promulgated Rule 35 authorizing just such an order." The
order, it would seem, is not enforced by holding the party in contempt of court for failure to obey; but other penalties are provided
in the way of not permitting the party ordered to undergo examination to introduce evidence as to the injuries until the order is complied with. This rule was affirmed upon consideration in Sibbac7h v.
Wilson,"- by a divided court. The dissent conceded legislative power
to change the rule but declined to attribute such result to Congress'
failure to disapprove the rules when submitted.': The whole chapter on evidence in our code64 generally involves procedure but by
close study it will be found that substantive rights are likewise involved in nearly all those statutes. The same applies even to the
chapter on pleading, practice and procedure.6 " except to those incidents of procedure having to do with the commencement of a suit.
and, as we noted above, there is even some question about that. But,
in an examination of the Federal Rules on Civil Procedure and in
the examination of various codes of rules on procedure, except as
noted below, one is impressed by the degree to which the courts in
maling rules have stuck to the little details of rules of decorum, internal management of the court, commencement of the action, issuing of process and service of the same, the forms of pleadings, the
pleadings themselves, motions, making of parties and new parties to
actions, interpleaders, method of introducing evidence, conduct of
the trial, and various other matters, all rather simple and routine,
for the purpose of creating uniformity and streamlining trials without in any way affecting anybody's rights. But the Supreme Court
of the United States, the Maryland Court of Appeals, the Texas
Supreme Court, and others with real rule-making power which is
exercised on a large scale got the acquiescence of their legislative
bodies in their rules after they were drafted.6 6 It is interesting on
the other hand to note Pennsylvania making sweeping changes by
61 Extensive reference to state statutes or rules authorizing such examination and to state decisions approving their constitutionality was set
forth in the annotation of the advisory committee which accompanies the
Rule.0
2312 U. S. 1 (1941) (5-4 deeision).
33Id. at 18.
64 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943)

c. 57.
05ld. at e. 56.
66 See 1 MD. CODE ANN. (Flack, 1939) art. 26,
non, Supp. 1939) art. 1731a, § 2.

§ 35;
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rules which are not to be submitted to the legislature. 7 Some of the
fields covered are venue, forms of action, such as assumpsit, trespass,
ejectment, quieting title, replevin and quo warranto. Attachment
actions will be consolidated. The subjects of rules drafted by the
committee in charge to be submitted to the court included construction, conduct of the business of the courts, appeals from administrative agencies of the state and parties to actions, as follows: real
parties in interest, corporations as parties, partnerships as parties,
associations as parties, the conunonwealth and political subdivisions
as parties, minors as parties, incompetents as parties, actions for
wrongful death, joinder of additional parties, nonresident defendants, interpleader, and intervention. Rules on depositions, discovery, eminent domain, and assessment of damages are also in the
offing. The Pennsylvania statute in breadth of authority would
seem to be about in a class with that in West Virginia. Those rules
already made and those in the making will not be submitted to the
legislature, according to information from a member of the Procedural Rules Committee.
It makes no difference that the legislature has failed to exclude
substantive law specifically from the rule-making power passed on to
our supreme court. If there were no constitutional prohibition
against it, there is no reason why the legislature might not delegate
authority for making rules involving substantive as well as procedural law; but the courts have not encouraged this generally speaking-in fact. they have been very reluctant to use the powers authorized by statute in various states. In this state, the legislative, executive and judicial powers are clearly separated by the constitution',
and our supreme court has always given great weight to this provision of the constitution," hence, any rule of court made touching
substantive law in any degree would be invalid as legislating. It
would seem clear, then, that our court is limited in scope to matters
purely of pleading, practice, and procedure; and to be consistent, it
probably should not make rules involving" twilight zone" questions.
In Colorado, in 1913, full rule-making powers had been given the
court; in 1929, it made a rule relative to commenting on the evidence.
The legislature revoked the rule. The court ceased making rules
67 Cf. Kenworthy and Anderson, The New .Procedural .Thes (1946) 18
PA. B. A. Q. 59.
Supra note 21.
69 The recent case of Sims v. Fisher, 125 W. Va. 512, 25 S. E. (2d) 216

65

(11943), relies heavily on this constitutional provision and contains a collection
of other West Virginia decisions of like nature.
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then until 1941 when rules substantially paralleling the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in Colorado."0
Many are the questions that might be posed to intrigue one's
sense of reasoning, viz.:
Under some statutes of frauds, one state, as a penalty for noncompliance, calls for voiding the alleged contract; another, for nonenforcement of it. Substantive law is involved in the one case and
procedural law in the other case. Now, in a state having the nonenforcement statute, "unless in writing", etc., could the court make
a rule and add "or unless proven by at least two disinterested witnesses?"
Take this example: A tort-feasor, by statute, cannot testify to
what decedent said at the time or before the accident resulting in
death. After the occurrence, the law is changed and he can. This
merely affects the remedy in a proceeding in which there is no vested right but, in rule-making, this matter would seem to be substantive, involving fairness and legal tradition. The same situation occurs in matters involving the statute of frauds. If substantive law
isnot involved, there would seem to be at least a "substantial or substantive principle" involved in rule-making. viz., "changing the
rules in the middle of the game."
Here is a case: In one state, one witness is sufficient to establish a certain fact. Tn another state, it takes two witnesses. The
forum governs because procedure is involved but suppose the first
state changes the statute to require two witnesses after the alleged
fact had occurred. The statute would govern because no vested
right is involved. But suppose the court makes the change by rule
of evidence. Would the bar or the public or the legislature, at this
time, stand for changing this rule in the middle of the game?
In one state a spouse may be a witness against the other, in another not. Here. in the forum, procedure is involved but it is substantive law or at least the case is in the "twilight zone" in the lex
loci, in the event a court in the state in which the subject matter of
the suit occurred, changes the rule after the cause of action arose.
Most statutes involving evidence, presumptions, and the like, although generally referred to as procedural, as a mere matter of
classification, seem in fact to be in the "twilight zone" and in a
great many instances are substantive law.
70

The Colorado experience is summarized in Harris, supra note 27, at 7.
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Chamberlayne went so far as to say there is no difference between substantive and procedural law and added: "The remedy
and the pre-determined machinery so far as the litigant has a recognized claim to use it are, legally speaking, part of the right itself." 71
Some writers question whether a distinction can be drawn between
things clearly regarded as "substantive law" and things which are
regarded as "important and substantial". Attorneys relied on the
latter in Sibbacli v. Wilson. It is of particular interest at this time
to observe the difficulty the United Nations have had at their conferences, over the distinction between substantive and procedural
matters. It will be remembered that originally it was decided the
veto power would only apply to substantive and not to procedural
matters ;72 but the Russians began vetoing procedural as well as substantive matters - apparently on the theory that procedural matters of substantial importance to the U.S.S.R. became substantive.
It has been thought by some that these distinctions are only a
difference of degree. 3 A rule or statute affecting the existence of
an accepted remedy or rule of procedure or even abbreviating or enlarging it is a rule of substance.
A very good, brief conclusion has been put by one writer thus:
"Procedural law can be only vaguely defined; it is adjective law.
it is auxiliary to the substantive law and provides the method of enforcing substantive rights; a given rule may be treated as dealing
with a substantive light in one case and with procedure in another;
because of the difference between the ultimate questions in the two
cases. The answer to the question, 'What is procedural?' depends
upon the answer to another question, 'Why do you want to know ? "7
This authority further concludes that the litigant should have no
right in precepts which are designed to provide for the orderly dispatch of judiciary business, the saving of public time, and the maintenance of the dignity of tribunals. These are proper subjects for
rules of court. The other class of precepts, designed to assure to
each litigant full and fair opportunity of presenting his case and
71 1 OHAMBE1ILAYNE, loc. cit.

supra note 8.

72 This is expressed in the difference between U. N. (?LrTEa, Art. 27, § 2,
and id. § 3, incorporating the results of the so-called "Yalta formula". Tho
matter is fully discussed in Kelsen, Organization and Procedure of the Security
Council of the United Nations (1946) 59 lrtv. L. REv. 1087, especially at 11002108.
73 Cf. HOLiES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPEnS (1920) 232; Lsws, THE ANATomy op SCIENCE (1926) 178.
74 Green, To What Extent May Courts under the Rule-Making Power Proscribe Rules of Evidence? (1920) 26 A. B. A. J. 482, 483.
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maling the case against him, constitutes a more complicated problem. To what. extent a canon of this second class is a matter of individual right and to what extent merely of judicial convenience or
of detail depends upon public policy and the content of the concept
of justice. "Almost any rule of evidence can be made to appear to
involve substantive elements, if an exaggerated view of the importance of method is accepted.7 An example is Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules upon plaintiff's theory in Sibbach v. Wilson that the procedure changed by the rule was "substantially important".
Summary and Conclusions
It seems the whole thing sums up to this: There is no need for
any wholesale changing of rules or adoption'of a code of rules in
West Virginia at this time. There is no demand for it. Our present
system is too satisfactory. There are a few changes that may be
needed. Some of them will, no doubt, be effected without the aid of
legislative action. In maling rules, the court will undoubtedly consider every proposed change from a constitutional and fundamental
standpoint, whether it promotes justice, whether it is in accord with
legislative policy in the state, whether it will promote uniformity of
procedure or cause any radical change in the result to litigants, and
if any serious question should arise in regard to any change or in
regard to the abolition of any statute or in the making of any completely new rules, the court in case of doubt will consult the legislature. This is the recommended procedure which has been resorted
to by the Federal Government and by several of the states.
There has been so much written on the subject of this paper and
there is such a contrariety of opinion that it has not been its purpose
to convince or persuade, except as to one thing, which is, that no
clear definition can be given for substantive or procedural law to
fit all cases nor can any formula be provided as a guide in rule-making. Each proposed rule must be studied separately with the concepts above enumerated in mind.
1. No satisfactory. workable formula to be used as a yardstick
in maling rules by the court is possible. Many formulas might be
given but each one would be phrased according to the individual
75 Id.

at 489.
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point of view While the writer knows that it is not a satisfactory
one, he has experimented with the following:
Procedure for rule-making is the method by which a right
is defended or maintained in court without affecting the right
itself. Any procedure which in any degree infringes upon,
changes, or affects the right itself, either vested, inchoate, or'
conditional, and which makes it easier for the plaintiff to naintain his case or more difficult for the defendant to defend his
side of the case, involves substantive law.
2. There is no immediate need for a complete code of rules in
West Virginia.
3. Each suggested rule change should be considered on its own
merits as to whether it promotes justice and expedites the court's
work. If so, it should be made. If there is substantial doubt as to
whether only procedural law is involved, it should be submitted to
the legislature as a matter of expediency.
4. An amendment should probably be made to rule-making
sections of the West Virginia Code7 providing that from time to
time, in its discretion, the court may submit proposed rules to the
legislature at least ten days before any session, and if no action is
taken before adjournment of the legislature, the rules as drafted by
the court will become effective on the day of adjournment.
5. There are and will be many instances where new rules will be
found desirable by the bench and bar, especially in cases where the
legislature has failed to act, e. g., in not having provided any procedure in an action or suit for declaratory judgment.
6. It is obvious that rule-making by the court when needed is
more desirable than by legislative enactment.
7. The bar generally and as a whole will not be interested in
whether some rules intrude on the substantive law but whether the
rules promote justice and facilitate the work of the judge and the
lawyers.
8. Sight should not be lost of the fact that the substantive common law, as well as procedural common law, is judge-made (if not
-reated, at least moulded) and a great majority of the bar and the
public prefer this method to legislative enactment. Certainly if the
court has the right to change the rule by decision, it should have the
right to make the rule in the first place.
9. Primarily, legislative enactment was used when the judges
went wrong or new conditions made a change desirable and the
768 upra notes 13, 14.
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judges were too stubborn or indolent to correct the situation or succeeding judges, through courtesy to their predecessors, failed to do
SO.
10. Theoretically it is only where a new and different policy
regarding the subject matter of rules of court is desirable that legislative enactment should be required and theoretically, when the legislature goes beyond that, it is in the field of the judiciary.
11. It must not be overlooked that substantive law for rulemaking purposes depends on the degree of importance the particular
individual attaches to the subject matter under consideration. Substantive law may, therefore, be regarded as a relative concept, relative as to importance to the individual and also relative as to importance for the purpose for which the law or rule in brought into
use. It may be that under this concept of what is substantive law,
the term itself is a misnomer. At any rate, the term is an enigma,
evasive and elusive.
"One by one we have seen how categories which at first
seem sharply defined merge one into another, and how every
classification when analyzed shows that some
imaginary line
'7
has been arbitrarily taken as a boundary.
12. Legislative enactment supplies to the common law the current philosophy of the day which tradition has not yet accepted as
a part of the common law.
13. As pointed out by Judge Paul in an address at the University of Washington in 1939:
"If the rule-making power is not fully exercised, there may
come a time when it will be contended, with at least the shadow
of legal support, that the power has been surrendered, or, if
not, that the failure to exercise the power will encourage legislators to tinker with procedure as they did before the passage
of the rule-making act." ' 8
14. Lastly, our West Virginia legislature has given broad
authority but none too broad. Courts probably had it already.
They should use it liberally to promote justice and expedite the
work of the courts but with discretion and expediency so as not to
antagonize the legislature, the bar, or the public. The law. aftel!
all, is a philosophy as well as a yardstick.
77 LEWIS, THE ANATOMY OF SCIENCE 178.
78 Paul, supra note 19.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol51/iss1/4

20

Curd: Substance and Procedure in Rule Making
PROCEDURE IN RULE MAKING
APPENDIX
The following list of materials is appended for the convenience of
those who may wish to pursue the subject further. While the list is not exhaustive, the works cited and those cited therein give a substantially complete coverage.
2 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, L6eture XXXV (4th ed. 1879)
BENTHAm, TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (transl. Dumont, 1825) cc.
1-3.
I CHAMIBERLAYNE, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1911) § 171.
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) c. 5.
HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE (11th ed. 1910) c. 7.
SALmiOND, JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) 172.
TERRY, LEADING PRINCIPLES OF ANGLO-AmIERICAN LAW (1884) C. 16.
Atwood, Promoting the Welfare of the Bar by Gourt Rule (1936) 15
NEEB L. BULL. 69.
Cook, "SUBSTANCE" AND "'PRocEDURE" in the Conflift of Laws (1933)
42 YALE L. J. 333.
Faulconer, Improving the Administration of Justice through the RuleMaking Power of the Courts, KAN. JUD. COUNCIL, 10TH ANNUAL REP. (part
1) (1926) 6.
Gertner, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Make Rules (1936) 10
U. oF CiN. L. REV. 32.
Green, To What Extent May Courts under the Rule-Making Power 1Prescribe Rules of Evidence? (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 482.
Kocourek, Substance ad Procedure (1941) 10 FORDnAm L. REV. 157.
Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 32
YALE L. J. 311.
MeClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of
Laws (1930) 78 U. oF PA. L. REV. 933.
Paul, The Rule-Making Power of Courts (1926) 1 WASH. L. REV. 163.
Pound, Rule-Making Power of Courts (1936) 21 MASS. L. Q. 70.
Tunks, Categorization and Federalism; "Substance" and "Procedure"
after Erie Railroa'd v. Tompkins (1940) 34 ILL. L. REV. 271.
Tyler, The Origin of the Bule-Making Power and Its Exercise by Legislatures (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 772.
Wheaton, Courts and the Rule-Making Powers (1936) 1 Mo. L. REV.
261.
Committee on Rule Making and Judicial Councils, Report (1936) 21
MASS. L. Q. 65.
Rule Making Power (1937) 35 MICH. L. REV. 1930.
Practice and Procedure - Courts - The Rule Making Power (1936) 14
NEB. L. BULL. 289.
I am indebted to Judge Charles H. Paul of Seattle, Washington, for the
following references to materials

on

the rule-making power of the courts

prepared by the University of Washington Law Library, which he has generously made available to me:
Andrews, Fundamentals of the Rule-Making Power of the Courts (1929)
2 FLA. S. B. A. L. J. 7.
Bar Association Delegates' Conference Committee, The R,ule-Making
Power of the Courts (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. Supp. to March issue (the entire
Supplement consists of articles on various phases of the subject with con-
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55

tributions by Cushing, Cutting, Grinnel, Hinton, Marvel, Pound, Shelton,
and Sunderland).
Houck, Judicial Powev and the Duty to Eliminate Unlawful Practice of
the Law (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 717.
Marvel. The Bule-Making Power of the Courts (1928) 12 J. Am. JuD.
Soo. 55.
Marvel, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts (1929) 9 B. U. L. RBv. 91.
Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 599.
Shelton, Progress of the ProposoZ to Substitute Rules of Court for
Common Law Practice (1927) 12 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 513.
Sunderland, The Need of a Rule-Making Power (1937) 10 J. Am. Ju.
Soc. 148.
Webster, A Practical Use of the Rule-Making Power (1937) 10 J. Am.
JUD. Soc. 148.
Cbourts-ule-Making Power (1933) 21 GEo. L. J. 352.
Committee on Rule-Making Power and Judicial Councils, Report (1933)
19 MASS. L. Q. 1.
Validity of Court Rule Concerning
Courts Rule-Making Power ,Waiver of Jury Trial which Conflicts with Statute (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 651.
Recent Statutes on Rule-Making Power of Courts (1927) 34 W. VA. L. Q.
84.
Earlier bibliographies in the field, to which reference is hereby made,
axe to be found at (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 199, and (1926) 6 ORE. L. RBr. 36.
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